Military Autonomous Systems - How will the Australian Defense Force (ADF) leverage robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) to gain and maintain an advantage across the spectrum of engagement, competition and conflict? And how can the ADF counter the threat posed to future forces by its adversary RAS? These are the questions currently being asked by the ADF Force Research Department as they prepare for the ADF Draft.
For the first time in the Australian military blogosphere, The Central Blue, The Forge and Grounded Curiosity are working together to support the development of future joint ADF concepts. We will achieve this through our network of readers and contributors and by using our platforms as an outlet for generated ideas.
Military Autonomous Systems
, which aims to describe how the future ADF will use RAS to achieve strategic advantages from the end of this decade.
An Automated Direct And Indirect Mortar System Is Operated From A Distance By U.s. Soldiers During A Multinational Joint Equipment Training Exercise With The U.s. Military At Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, April
RAS has been heralded as a breakthrough technology with the potential to lead the world into the 4th Industrial Revolution. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, procreation, alternative energy, additive manufacturing and advanced materials are coming together in RAS.
Systems are already being developed with a high degree of autonomy, stealth and persistence; as systems such as the Sea Hunter and the Boeing Air Power Teaming System (Loyal Wingman) move beyond design documents and into testing, attention is turning to how RAS can improve current military capabilities.
Future ADF concept developers want to look beyond the immediate and consider how the ADF of the future should embrace RAS to succeed in 2040. In addition to the current opportunities RAS Force Exploration also examines the threats they pose.
The ADF will not be the only actor seeking strategic disruption using RAS. State and non-state actors are pursuing this technology for their own benefit versus our strategic interests. The opponent gets one vote.
Asylon Pushes Autonomous Security Drone Limits
So, in addition to determining the ADF's requirements for RAS personnel, it is important that force planners also explore how the ADF will counter the RAS threat? Does RAS have unique exploitable vulnerabilities?
The Central Blue/The Forge/Grounded Curiosity #ADFras2040 series will explore these questions and consider how the ADF can use RAS in the future to pursue and secure a strategic advantage over potential adversaries. We encourage contributions from students, academics, policy makers, service personnel of all grades, industry and others with an interest in these issues. We (the editors) encourage potential contributors to work with the editorial team early in the writing process!
This series is the first of what we hope will be more collaborative efforts to support developers of the ADF concept. Although #ADFras2040 is a collaborative series, there are no plans to cross-submit entries between sites. However, the compilation will be done behind the scenes and on social media.
We encourage you to make your voice heard by submitting your ideas to The Central Blue, The Forge, and Grounded Curiosity. Articles should be between 500 and 1500 words. Transitions, both in professional sports and in business, are crucial to getting things right. Those who get the right to benefit from the advantages of championship or market share; those that don't are easily outclassed, lose market share, or simply cease to exist (such as Kodak or Blockbuster). Transitions for the military are no different. Between the two world wars, Germany developed its blitzkrieg ("lightning war") doctrine, while the French developed the Maginot Line. As the US military finds itself in transition after nearly 20 years of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it must get it right.
Lethal Autonomous Weapon
This is not the first major military transition. After the Vietnam War, the military's conceptual focus shifted from counterinsurgency and recruitment to new, high-tech armor integrated with a state-of-the-art air force to confront the Soviet Union. This new concept, called AirLand Battle, is the result of a major transformation of military doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities. Today, after decades of focusing on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the military is transitioning to a different battlefield concept known as multi-domain operations. This concept envisages the simultaneous use of army, navy, air force, cyber and space forces to compete with Russia or China in armed conflict and, if necessary, to defeat it.
Despite admirable progress, effective multi-domain doctrine is still problematic due to excessive commitment to legacy platforms. Looking at the factors that facilitated the Army's transition to AirLand Battle, there is no reason to be optimistic that multi-domain operations will be as successful as AirLand Battle. The military remains committed to figuring out what kind of force it wants to be — with big, expensive, expensive manned systems — while operating in an environment that seems more suited to small, big, and smart people. Few and exquisite systems are always more vulnerable compared to the advantages of abundant and affordable. What is preventing the US military from transitioning to an affordable, wealthy and autonomous force?
A mix of factors is responsible, but the first thing to do is to determine why an affordable, abundant and autonomous force is the best force. A force built on the concept of "a little and a lot" is better because it is faster, easier and less vulnerable to produce. It offers greater strategic, operational and tactical mobility; and more importantly, it can defeat its superior counterparts in large-scale combat and multi-domain operations.
Current platform manufacturing sites are extremely vulnerable – more so than at any time in history. Currently, M1 Abrams tanks and other combat platforms are assembled in various static geographic locations, depending on the expert specialists in the production of these outstanding capabilities. These production areas are vulnerable to hypersonic missile attacks, proxy forces, cyber operations, or even the potential targeting of critical personnel, which could result in a complete shutdown of all production in time of war.
Shaping A Way Ahead For Maritime Autonomous Systems
For strategic mobility, autonomous vehicles can be designed and manufactured simply enough to allow the proliferation of multiple factories. These factories could be moved from one place to another to avoid destroying the entire supply chain for a particular car in one attack. Although this may seem difficult, inefficient, or unnecessary, it is important to note that the Soviet Union's military capabilities were saved by the Herculean effort of its citizens to evacuate over 1,500 military factories in mid-1941 after the invasion. German army. With the dispersion and mobility of the nation's factories producing an abundance of affordable combat platforms, the US military can rely on uninterrupted supply from the continental United States.
Affordable and autonomous vehicles can also improve the operational mobility of the US Armed Forces in several ways. In addition to overseas delivery from the continental United States, allied nations can even produce affordable autonomous platforms to provide immediate wartime needs throughout the area of operations. For example, if the US or allied forces had mobile factories in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, this could reduce the need for a consolidated and time-intensive supply of traditional equipment, expensive, equipped from ship to shore and well forward. Additionally, compared to sophisticated platforms such as the M1 Abrams tank, the reduced tonnage of small autonomous vehicles allows them to cross many more bridges that would otherwise require extensive military engineering efforts while likely under fire.
Smaller autonomous vehicles can also provide the advantage of improved tactical mobility compared to their heavier manned counterparts. The size and weight of traditional craft vehicles prevent them from being able to perform deep amphibious crossings. Instead, the US military now relies on complex, high-risk river crossing operations using limited bridging equipment. During traditional river crossing operations, this bridging equipment is vulnerable to enemy fire before large combat platforms can be used to cross. On the other hand, light autonomous vehicles could conduct large-scale amphibious assaults independently of bridge support. This would allow military forces to quickly gain combat power on the other side of the river, long before more permanent bridging infrastructure would need to be built for follow-on forces.
AirLand combat doctrine relied on excellent platforms to "fight the numbers and win". During the Gulf War, the US-led coalition upheld this doctrine against Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army. That was in 1991. Today's modern technology of mass autonomy and remote control systems in the era of multi-domain operations will likely bring victory to those who have exceptional autonomous combat power in sheer numbers during large-scale ground combat. Land-based reconnaissance and security, typically limited by supply lines and risk appetite, can be expanded in scope and duration almost indefinitely with rich, affordable, and autonomous systems. This almost unlimited recognition and security will give military leaders a significant advantage over their adversaries. In addition, autonomous systems allow U.S. military leaders to conduct covert maneuvers behind enemy lines to ambush or attack unsuspecting enemy forces.
Autonomous Systems And The Next War
US conventional forces have rarely used stealth as a form of maneuver because soldiers are at great risk of being captured or killed behind enemy lines. Today, high autonomy can reap tremendous benefits from this advantageous maneuver that the Chinese military used with devastating effect against American forces in the Korean War. Besides, yes
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